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1. Introduction 
Distributed generation (DG) is related to the use of small generating units installed close to 
consumption centres. Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in connecting generation to 
the distribution networks due to the environmental concern increase.  
 
Most protection systems for distribution networks assume power flows from the grid 
supply point to the downstream low voltage network (Jenkins et al, 2000). Protection is 
normally based on overcurrent relays with settings selected to ensure discrimination 
between upstream and downstream relays. A fault on a downstream feeder must be cleared 
by the relay at the source end of the main feeder. It must not result in the operation of any of 
the relays on an upstream feeder unless the downstream relay fails to clear the fault. This 
will result in a blackout in a part of the network that should not have been affected by the 
fault. 
 
If generation is embedded into the distribution system, the fault current seen by the relay 
may increase or decrease depending on the location of the relay, the fault and the 
distributed generators. To ensure an appropriate coordination between relays, grading 
studies must take into account the maximum and the minimum infeed from all the 
embedded generators and from the grid supply point. 
 
This chapter describes the protection system problems in distribution systems when 
connecting distributed generation. First section describes the protection system 
characteristics in distribution systems without distributed generation, followed by the IEEE 
requirements for distributed generators under fault conditions (IEEE, 2003). After that the 
influence of distributed generation on system protection is analysed, taking into account 
grading, recloser operation and fault detection problems. Fault detection problems are 
specially relevant for wind turbines. Finally, some conclusions and future solutions that are 
being developed are described. 
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2. Protection in distribution systems 
The objective of the utilities is to deliver electric energy in a safe, reliable, and economical 
manner (IEEE 2007). Protective relaying is applied to distribution lines to achieve this 
objective. The main objectives of a protection system are to detect and respond to all 
possible types of fault conditions that could occur, while affecting the minimum number of 
customers, and not limiting the capability of the system to carry load current. Since 
attempting to accomplish some of these objectives makes it impossible to accomplish others, 
compromises need to be made. The limits of these compromises are the criteria used to 
determine locations for the fault-interrupting devices, and the sensitivity and operating 
speed of the fault detecting devices. 
 
There are different protective schemes applied to distribution systems, the overcurrent 
protection and the fuse saving/blowing scheme are the most used. These schemes are 
detailed below. 
 
2.1 Overcurrent scheme 
Overcurrent protection is the simplest scheme used to protect distribution lines. There are 
two types of overcurrent relays applied to distribution systems: phase overcurrent and 
ground overcurrent relays. 
These relays can be directional or non-directional depending on system configuration and 
protection requirements. For radial distribution, non-directional overcurrent relays are 
applied; while for looped system networks, directional overcurrent relays are more 
appropriate. 
 
In almost all cases, the distribution feeder protection begins at the substation with feeder 
breaker or recloser. The recloser is normally equipped with an inverse-time overcurrent 
device which detects faults and orders the trip of the breaker. Then, after a preset delay, it 
recloses the breaker. This device should be coordinated upstream with the protection of 
high voltage transformer and with downstream devices. Downstream devices are generally 
reclosers or fuses. All of the protective devices placed in series should coordinate on a time -
current basis with each other in order to minimize the impact of an outage due to a fault. 
Fig. 1 shows the overcurrent scheme applied in a radial network. 
 
 Fig. 1. Overcurrent relays applied to radial distribution network 
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2.2 Fuse saving/blowing schemes 
Protection schemes for distribution feeders based on fuses are generally divided in two 
types: 
 
a) Fuse saving schemes 
b) Fuse blowing schemes 
 
An example system for fuse blowing/fuse saving schemes is given in fig. 2. 
 
Fuse saving schemes are effective on long multi-tapped rural distribution feeders with 
primarily residential loads that are not as sensitive to momentary outages as industrial 
loads. In a fuse-saving scheme, breakers or reclosers are set such that they trip before the 
fuse operates and then automatically reclose (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). In many cases, faults 
are only temporary and the line will successfully reclose, causing only a momentary 
disruption.  
 
Fuse blowing schemes are used to limit the number of main feeder trip reclose cycles in 
distribution feeders where loads are sensitive to momentary outages and significant 
disruption occurs if the line is momentarily deenergized. This scheme is often used on 
feeders serving industrial plants and urban load centres where a number of trip-reclose 
cycles could result in equipment damage or added risk of personal injury. In this type of 
schemes, the overcurrent relay or recloser control curves are set above fuse curves such that 
fuses operate first to clear the faulted line section and the substation device serves as a back-
up in case the fuse fails, in addition to its function of operating for faults on the main feeder 
trunk. 
 
 Fig. 2. Example system for fuse scheme 
 
S 
Source 
F1 F2 
F3 F4 
F5 
F6 
Load1 
Load2 
Load4 
Load3 
Load5 
Load6 
www.intechopen.com
Protection in distributed generation 291
 
2. Protection in distribution systems 
The objective of the utilities is to deliver electric energy in a safe, reliable, and economical 
manner (IEEE 2007). Protective relaying is applied to distribution lines to achieve this 
objective. The main objectives of a protection system are to detect and respond to all 
possible types of fault conditions that could occur, while affecting the minimum number of 
customers, and not limiting the capability of the system to carry load current. Since 
attempting to accomplish some of these objectives makes it impossible to accomplish others, 
compromises need to be made. The limits of these compromises are the criteria used to 
determine locations for the fault-interrupting devices, and the sensitivity and operating 
speed of the fault detecting devices. 
 
There are different protective schemes applied to distribution systems, the overcurrent 
protection and the fuse saving/blowing scheme are the most used. These schemes are 
detailed below. 
 
2.1 Overcurrent scheme 
Overcurrent protection is the simplest scheme used to protect distribution lines. There are 
two types of overcurrent relays applied to distribution systems: phase overcurrent and 
ground overcurrent relays. 
These relays can be directional or non-directional depending on system configuration and 
protection requirements. For radial distribution, non-directional overcurrent relays are 
applied; while for looped system networks, directional overcurrent relays are more 
appropriate. 
 
In almost all cases, the distribution feeder protection begins at the substation with feeder 
breaker or recloser. The recloser is normally equipped with an inverse-time overcurrent 
device which detects faults and orders the trip of the breaker. Then, after a preset delay, it 
recloses the breaker. This device should be coordinated upstream with the protection of 
high voltage transformer and with downstream devices. Downstream devices are generally 
reclosers or fuses. All of the protective devices placed in series should coordinate on a time -
current basis with each other in order to minimize the impact of an outage due to a fault. 
Fig. 1 shows the overcurrent scheme applied in a radial network. 
 
 Fig. 1. Overcurrent relays applied to radial distribution network 
51,51N 
51,51N 
51,51N 
132 kV 
15 kV 
15 kV 400 V 
400 V 
15 kV 
Substation 
Feeder breaker 
Downstream Upstream 
 
2.2 Fuse saving/blowing schemes 
Protection schemes for distribution feeders based on fuses are generally divided in two 
types: 
 
a) Fuse saving schemes 
b) Fuse blowing schemes 
 
An example system for fuse blowing/fuse saving schemes is given in fig. 2. 
 
Fuse saving schemes are effective on long multi-tapped rural distribution feeders with 
primarily residential loads that are not as sensitive to momentary outages as industrial 
loads. In a fuse-saving scheme, breakers or reclosers are set such that they trip before the 
fuse operates and then automatically reclose (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). In many cases, faults 
are only temporary and the line will successfully reclose, causing only a momentary 
disruption.  
 
Fuse blowing schemes are used to limit the number of main feeder trip reclose cycles in 
distribution feeders where loads are sensitive to momentary outages and significant 
disruption occurs if the line is momentarily deenergized. This scheme is often used on 
feeders serving industrial plants and urban load centres where a number of trip-reclose 
cycles could result in equipment damage or added risk of personal injury. In this type of 
schemes, the overcurrent relay or recloser control curves are set above fuse curves such that 
fuses operate first to clear the faulted line section and the substation device serves as a back-
up in case the fuse fails, in addition to its function of operating for faults on the main feeder 
trunk. 
 
 Fig. 2. Example system for fuse scheme 
 
S 
Source 
F1 F2 
F3 F4 
F5 
F6 
Load1 
Load2 
Load4 
Load3 
Load5 
Load6 
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation 292
 
3. Requirements for Distributed Resources in Electric Power Systems 
IEEE standard for interconnecting distributed generators with electric power systems (IEEE, 
2008) provides interconnection technical specifications and requirements. As it is pointed 
out in the standard, its existence does not imply that there are no other ways to operate in 
subjects related to its scope. However it can be assumed as a guide, so standard technical 
criteria, specially those which involve protection system, are summed up in this section. 
 
3.1 General requirements 
The following are some of the most relevant general requirements for distributed generators 
(DGs) specified in the IEEE standard. The requirements involved in fault conditions are 
described in sections below. 
 Voltage requirements: The DGs shall not cause variations in the area electric power system 
(area EPS) service voltage at other areas. 
Grounding: The grounding scheme of the DGs interconnection shall not cause overvoltages 
that exceed the rating of the equipment connected to the area EPS and shall not affect the 
coordination of the ground fault protection on that area. 
Synchronization: The connection of the DGs shall not cause a voltage fluctuation at the point 
of common coupling greater than ±5% of the prevailing voltage level of the area power 
system at that point.  
Area energization: The DGs shall not energize the area power system if it is de-energized. 
 
3.2 Requirements under fault conditions 
The standard specifies the response of the distribution resources when abnormal conditions, 
such as faults, arise on the area EPS. According to the standard, the DG units shall cease to 
energize the area power system for faults on the area circuit to which they are connected. If 
a fault is detected in a circuit, and the circuit has been de-energized by its protection system 
in order to clear the fault, no source embebed on the circuit must energize it.  
To achieve the interruption of the energization of a faulted circuit and fulfil the standard 
requirement, the distribution generation unit can be isolated by the following means: 
Remote fault detection by the power system circuit protections and subsequent direct 
transfer trip of the DG unit, using communications. 
Local fault detection by the DG unit and subsequent disconnection from the system.  
 
The ability of the DG units to detect external faults depends strongly on the technology of 
the generator and the type of fault. The behaviour of different types of generators against 
faults are described next: 
Synchronous generator: These units produce fault currents during extended periods of time. 
The initial fault contribution can reach more than six times the generator full-load current 
and can decay over several seconds below generator full-load current as the generator field 
collapses. Furthermore, during the fault, the voltage on the generator is significatively 
depressed, which can be used to aid in fault detection. 
Based on the described current contribution and voltage depression, different methods 
are commonly used by the DG units based on synchronous generator to detect faults, 
such as voltage-controlled overcurrent relays and voltage-restrained overcurrent relays. 
 
Voltage-controlled overcurrent relays are adjusted for a fixed sensitivity. The 
overcurrent function is enabled only when the voltage is depressed, which is controlled 
by an undervoltage element. As the sensitivity of the overcurrent relay is a fixed value, 
the adjusted current must be the minimum magnitude of faults that persist for a long 
time, which can cause coordination difficulties. 
Voltage restrained overcurrent relays can be adjusted at different sensitivity levels 
depending on the voltage depression. Typically, at 25% voltage, the sensitivity is four 
times the one at the rated voltage.  
Induction generator and double-fed asynchronous generator: The ability of protective relays to 
detect faults on the basis of fault-current contribution from this kind of generators depends 
on the persistence of the fault-current contribution and the required time for relay operation. 
The persistence of fault current depends on the type of fault (single- or multiphase), the 
severity of fault, and the means by which the reactive power requirements of the induction 
generator are supplied. 
Due to the importance of these generators, mainly used in wind farms, section 4.3 details 
their behaviour against faults.  
Inverters: Most inverters can not supply important currents under external fault conditions; 
usually no more than 1.2 to 1.5 times their rated load current. Fault detection schemes using 
overcurrent principles, which are universally applied, are not usually effective in this case. 
DG units that use this technology must rely on other methods such as abnormal voltage or 
frequency sensing to detect faults on the area power system. 
In case of external faults, it is clear that the capacity of the distributed generators protections 
to detect them typically increases with the level of fault current supplied from these energy 
sources.  
On the other hand, the contribution of the DGs to external faults can affect the behaviour of 
the protections of the area power system. It is a fact that once a DG unit is connected to a 
power system circuit, it is an energy source that, depending on its type of generator 
technology, can also supply current to a fault in their evacuation circuit or even in another 
point of the local power system. The fault-current contribution of the DG unit is the amount 
of current that the DG will supply to a fault in the circuit. If the DG fault-current 
contribution is substantial, it will contribute significantly to the total current supplied to the 
fault. Furthermore, the area power system contribution to the fault will be reduced by the 
presence of the DG. This may affect the time taken by the protections of the area power 
system to detect the fault or, in an extreme case, to prevent them from detecting the fault. 
 
3.3 Requirements on reclosing coordination  
The DG units are required to cease energizing the circuit to which they are connected before 
any reclosing attempt of that circuit. 
Automatic reclosing is widely used in distribution networks in order to clear transient faults 
and restore the supply with the lower impact. Due to the common radial design in 
traditional feeders, where the power system is the only source of power, no voltage or sync-
check supervisions are needed to perform the reclose attempts. The installation of DGs 
involves changes on these basic design principles. The assumption that the power system is 
the only power source for the feeder is invalidated by the presence of disperse generators 
which can also energize the circuit. In order to avoid an important damage, all DG 
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protective devices are required to be carefully coordinated with the recloser of the circuit to 
which they are connected. If a temporary fault occurs in the feeder and the DG does not trip 
off and extinguish the fault arc prior to the circuit reclosing attempt, the reclosing attempt 
will be unsuccessful and the automatic restoration of that circuit may be jeopardized.  
 
3.4 Requirements under voltage and frequency abnormal conditions  
DG units are required to cease to energize the area power system under some voltage 
conditions. Table 1 specifies the clearing times required depending on the voltage value. 
 
Voltage range  
(% of base voltage)a Clearing time (s)b 
V < 50 0.16 
50  V < 88 2.00 
110 < V < 120 1.00 
V  120 0.16 
a Base voltages are the nominal system voltages stated in ANSI C84.1 1995,Table 1 
bDG ≤ 30 kW, maximum clearing times; DG > 30kW, default clearing times. 
Table 1. Interconnection system response to abnormal voltages 
 
When the system frequency is in the range given in Table 2, the DG shall cease to energize 
the area power system within the clearing time indicated (It must be pointed out that the 
nominal values considered in the standard are based on American system, where nominal 
frequency is 60 Hz).   
 
DG size Frequency range (Hz) Clearing time (s)a 
 30 kW > 60.5 0.16 < 59.3 0.16 
>30 kW 
> 60.5 0.16 
< {59.8-57} 
(adjustable set point) Adjustable 0.16 to 300 
< 57.0 0.16 
aDG ≤ 30 kW, maximum clearing times; DG > 30kW, default clearing times. 
Table 2. Interconnection system response to abnormal frequencies 
 
4. Influence of Distributed Generation in the protection system 
The interconnection of Distributed Generation (DG) brings a great change to the 
configuration of the utility distribution network (Yuping Lu, et al. 2007).  
 
As it has been mentioned before, nowadays, the most common configuration in distribution 
systems is radial. In this type of configurations only one source feeds a downstream 
network (Girgis & Brahma, 2001), (Dugan & Mcdermott, 2002). With the connection of DG, 
in case of fault, the system can lose the radial configuration, since the DG sources contribute 
to the fault and therefore, the system coordination could be lost (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). 
 
The connection of DG in distribution networks must take into account the following 
subjects: 
 
 Protection behaviour (coordination problems)  
 Adequate ratings of power equipments 
 Islanding  
 Detection problems 
 Operation procedures  
 
The connection of new generation sources in the distribution system modifies the power 
flow, customer’s voltage conditions and the requirements of the utility equipment (Barker& 
de Mello, 2000). In a fault situation, distributed generators modify the current contribution 
to fault, and therefore it influences in the behaviour of network protection (Yuping Lu, et al. 
2007), (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). The influence will depend on the number, type, location and 
size of DG (Yuping Lu, et al. 2007), (Girgis & Brahma, 2001).  Thus, the characteristics of 
power equipments and the coordination system, which were established without 
considering the contribution of distributed generation, must be checked when DG is going 
to be connected (Yuping Lu, et al. 2007). 
 
The requirements of network power equipments were established in a situation where DG 
did not exist. In a new situation where DG is present into the system, the initial design may 
not be adequate because the presence of DG modifies the power flow either in permanent or 
in fault situation.  
 
On a radial system without DG, the relay protection will see downstream faults because 
only in that direction will appear power flow. In this situation the fault is cleared opening 
the breaker of the main feeder because only the main feeder can contribute to the fault. 
When DG is present in the system, an additional power flow appears from load side to 
source side and vice versa, therefore the opening of the main feeder breaker does not assure 
that the fault is cleared (Girgis & Brahma, 2001), (Dugan & Mcdermott, 2002).  
 
Another possible situation when DG is connected is the island operation. It is produced 
when, once the breaker of the main feeder has opened after the fault, the DG continues 
feeding an isolated part of the network. The islanding is not desirable as it can produce 
safety and power quality problems in the isolated area. When a DG is working in island, 
frequency and voltage of this new part of the system can change and damage the system 
and loads connected in this area. Furthermore, if the distributed generator continues 
connected during a reclosing, serious damages can appear because of the difference between 
the grid and the island conditions (voltage, frequency, phase,...) (Barker &  de Mello, 2000).  
 
Another problem related to DG may be the different behaviour, in fault situation, between 
the different types of generators, in particular between synchronous and asynchronous 
generators. These differences are explained in section 4.3. 
 
Finally, in areas where the supply depends on distributed generation, if a fault occurs and 
DG is disconnected following the requirements of IEEE standard (IEEE, 2003), the network 
could not be able to feed the total load when the utility breaker closes after the fault is 
cleared. Therefore, changes in operating procedure will be necessary to restore power in 
these situations (Dugan &. Mcdermott, 2002). 
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and loads connected in this area. Furthermore, if the distributed generator continues 
connected during a reclosing, serious damages can appear because of the difference between 
the grid and the island conditions (voltage, frequency, phase,...) (Barker &  de Mello, 2000).  
 
Another problem related to DG may be the different behaviour, in fault situation, between 
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generators. These differences are explained in section 4.3. 
 
Finally, in areas where the supply depends on distributed generation, if a fault occurs and 
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could not be able to feed the total load when the utility breaker closes after the fault is 
cleared. Therefore, changes in operating procedure will be necessary to restore power in 
these situations (Dugan &. Mcdermott, 2002). 
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In this section coordination problems and automatic reclosing aspects related to the 
connection of DG to distribution networks are analyzed. Moreover, the behaviour of 
different types of generators before faults is described. 
 
4.1 Coordination problems 
In this section, an example illustrates the loss of coordination when DG is connected in a 
distribution network. First of all, the behaviour of distributed network without considering 
DG is analyzed, and after that, the loss of coordination due to the connection of DG is 
shown. 
 
As it has been commented in section 2, the most used protective schemes in distribution 
networks are fuse blowing and fuse saving schemes. Therefore, an example network is 
analyzed using both protective schemes.  
 
Case 1: Distribution network protected by fuse blowing schemes (Fuse-Fuse Coordination).  
 
A fuse is characterised by Minimum Melting (MM) and Total Clearing (TC) characteristics. 
The Minimum Melting characteristic gives the time in which fuse is melted for a given value 
of fault current and Total Clearing characteristic gives the fault clearing time of fuse 
considering fault arc extinction for a given value of fault current (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). 
Fig. 3 shows the example network protected by fuses. 
 
DG1 
SOURCE 
DG2 
F1 
A 
Fuse A1 Fuse B1 
LOAD 
Fuse C1 
LOAD 
F2 
B D 
C E 
Fuse B2 LOAD 
LOAD 
LOADS  Fig. 3. Fuse blowing scheme  
 
Initially, it is considered that DG is not connected. In this scenario, the network protection is 
coordinated for a fault on feeder 1 (F1) if both, fuse B1 acts before fuses A1, B2 and C1, and 
the TC characteristic of fuse B1 is lower than the MM characteristic of fuses A1, B2 and C1 
for all range of coordination (Ifmin, Ifmax). 
Fig. 4 shows the coordination graphic for fuses A1 and B1. 
 
 
 
 
Fuse B1 TC 
Fuse A1 MM 
Fuse A1 TC Fuse B1 MM 
CURRENT (A) 
TIME (S) Ifmax Ifmin 
 Fig. 4. Coordination graphic of fuses A1 and B1 
 
As it has been commented, when DG is connected in a distributed network, the range of 
fault current (Ifmin, Ifmax) is modified and current flows in two directions (from source side to 
load side and vice versa). In this new situation it could happen that the system, initially 
coordinated, losses the coordination. 
 
To illustrate how DG affects system fault current and system protection behaviour, the 
distributed network showed in fig. 3 is analyzed for faults in different locations. 
 
 Fault in section BD (Fault F1) 
 
For faults in section BD, the current fault levels, Ifmin and Ifmax, increase because of 
the presence of generators in source side (IB1=IA1+IB2).  
In this situation, the coordination between fuses could be lost if the increment of 
current fault makes the range of coordination (Ifmin’,Ifmax’) exceed the extent of the 
fuses curves, as it is shown in fig. 4. 
 
 Fault in section CE (Fault F2) 
 
Fuses C1 and B2 detect downstream and upstream faults. Moreover, the current 
seen by both of them is always the same. (IB2=IC1). 
In a coordinated system, it is desirable that for faults on feeder 2 (F2), the fuse C1 
acts before the fuse B2, and for faults on main line (F1), the fuse B2 acts before the 
fuse C1. As the current seen by both of them is the same, this requirement can not 
be fulfilled. 
 
Case 2: Distribution line protected by fuse saving schemes (Recloser-Fuse Coordination) 
 
Ifmin’ Ifmax’ 
www.intechopen.com
Protection in distributed generation 297
 
In this section coordination problems and automatic reclosing aspects related to the 
connection of DG to distribution networks are analyzed. Moreover, the behaviour of 
different types of generators before faults is described. 
 
4.1 Coordination problems 
In this section, an example illustrates the loss of coordination when DG is connected in a 
distribution network. First of all, the behaviour of distributed network without considering 
DG is analyzed, and after that, the loss of coordination due to the connection of DG is 
shown. 
 
As it has been commented in section 2, the most used protective schemes in distribution 
networks are fuse blowing and fuse saving schemes. Therefore, an example network is 
analyzed using both protective schemes.  
 
Case 1: Distribution network protected by fuse blowing schemes (Fuse-Fuse Coordination).  
 
A fuse is characterised by Minimum Melting (MM) and Total Clearing (TC) characteristics. 
The Minimum Melting characteristic gives the time in which fuse is melted for a given value 
of fault current and Total Clearing characteristic gives the fault clearing time of fuse 
considering fault arc extinction for a given value of fault current (Girgis & Brahma, 2001). 
Fig. 3 shows the example network protected by fuses. 
 
DG1 
SOURCE 
DG2 
F1 
A 
Fuse A1 Fuse B1 
LOAD 
Fuse C1 
LOAD 
F2 
B D 
C E 
Fuse B2 LOAD 
LOAD 
LOADS  Fig. 3. Fuse blowing scheme  
 
Initially, it is considered that DG is not connected. In this scenario, the network protection is 
coordinated for a fault on feeder 1 (F1) if both, fuse B1 acts before fuses A1, B2 and C1, and 
the TC characteristic of fuse B1 is lower than the MM characteristic of fuses A1, B2 and C1 
for all range of coordination (Ifmin, Ifmax). 
Fig. 4 shows the coordination graphic for fuses A1 and B1. 
 
 
 
 
Fuse B1 TC 
Fuse A1 MM 
Fuse A1 TC Fuse B1 MM 
CURRENT (A) 
TIME (S) Ifmax Ifmin 
 Fig. 4. Coordination graphic of fuses A1 and B1 
 
As it has been commented, when DG is connected in a distributed network, the range of 
fault current (Ifmin, Ifmax) is modified and current flows in two directions (from source side to 
load side and vice versa). In this new situation it could happen that the system, initially 
coordinated, losses the coordination. 
 
To illustrate how DG affects system fault current and system protection behaviour, the 
distributed network showed in fig. 3 is analyzed for faults in different locations. 
 
 Fault in section BD (Fault F1) 
 
For faults in section BD, the current fault levels, Ifmin and Ifmax, increase because of 
the presence of generators in source side (IB1=IA1+IB2).  
In this situation, the coordination between fuses could be lost if the increment of 
current fault makes the range of coordination (Ifmin’,Ifmax’) exceed the extent of the 
fuses curves, as it is shown in fig. 4. 
 
 Fault in section CE (Fault F2) 
 
Fuses C1 and B2 detect downstream and upstream faults. Moreover, the current 
seen by both of them is always the same. (IB2=IC1). 
In a coordinated system, it is desirable that for faults on feeder 2 (F2), the fuse C1 
acts before the fuse B2, and for faults on main line (F1), the fuse B2 acts before the 
fuse C1. As the current seen by both of them is the same, this requirement can not 
be fulfilled. 
 
Case 2: Distribution line protected by fuse saving schemes (Recloser-Fuse Coordination) 
 
Ifmin’ Ifmax’ 
www.intechopen.com
Distributed Generation 298
 
DG1 
SOURCE 
MT 
Recloser 
LOAD 
Fuse 
F1 
 Fig. 5. Fuse saving scheme 
 
Fig. 5 shows a distribution line where the main feeder is protected by a recloser and the load 
feeder is protected by a fuse. In this configuration the recloser has to act against temporary 
faults and the fuse against permanent ones. 
 
For the analysis of this configuration, a recloser actuation sequence Fast-Fast-Slow-Slow is 
supposed. According to this sequence, if faults occur in the load feeder, the recloser acts 
opening the feeder breaker according to its fast overcurrent curve. The feeder breaker stays 
in this state for a defined time until the recloser orders to close it, allowing temporary faults 
to be cleared. If the fault persists, the recloser acts again. If after the second fast actuation of 
the recloser the fault is not cleared, the fault is assumed to be permanent. Therefore, after the 
second fast actuation of the recloser, it changes its overcurrent curve to the slow one, so that 
the fuse acts faster than the recloser. For the correct performance of the described scheme, 
the recloser and the fuse must be coordinated, as it is shown in Fig. 6.  
 
 Fig. 6. Characteristics of the fuse (TC and MM) and the recloser (Fast and Slow) for a 
coordinated system 
Ifmax’ Ifmin’ 
 
As it is showed in Fig. 6, for a fault in the load feeder, if fault current is inside the limits (Ifmin 
and Ifmax), the system will be coordinated. From the curves is clear that, in that range of 
current, fast recloser curve is faster than the fuse one and that the slow recloser is slower 
than the fuse. If the fuse fails in its actuation, the slow recloser should act as backup 
protection. 
 
When DG is not connected, the currents seen by the recloser and the fuse for faults in the 
load feeder are the same so, while current fault is inside coordination range (Ifmin and Ifmax), 
the system is coordinated, as it is showed in Fig. 6.  
 
Considering that DG is connected, the new situation results into the following changes: 
 
 The minimum and the maximum fault currents for a fault in load feeder are 
modified because of the presence of DG. 
 The fault current seen by the recloser is different to the current seen by the fuse.  
 
If fault level increases due to DG, it could happen that fault currents are outside the 
coordination range. As it is showed in Fig. 6, in this situation the system loses the 
coordination because the MM characteristic of the fuse is lower than the fast recloser curve. 
 
The different currents seen by the recloser and by the fuse depend on the size, location and 
type of DG. This difference of current can cause coordination problems to appear, if the 
current seen by both protections makes the fuse to act before the fast recloser actuation. 
 
The described problems get worse if intermittency of renewable energy sources, which are 
mostly used in distributed generators, is considered.  
 
4.2 Automatic reclosing problems 
For a normal system operation, in a scenario where islanding is not contemplated, as it is 
recommended in the IEEE Std. 1547 (IEEE, 2003), the correct sequence of events in case of 
fault is the following (Pregelj et al, 2006):  
 
1. The feeder circuit breaker is tripped, ordered by its protection devices 
2. DG connected to the feeder is tripped 
3. The recloser reconnects the feeder automatically 
4. DG reconnects after normal operating voltage and frequency are established.  
 
As it has been advanced in section 3.3, automatic reclosing is a widely extended practice in 
distribution networks and, in fact, it is necessary to clear transient faults and restore the 
supply with the lower impact. Under the basic assumption that upstream substation is the 
only power source for the distribution feeder, reclosing practices usually do not consider 
voltage or synchronism supervision, and most of the operators use instantaneous reclosing 
in distribution networks. 
 
The presence of DG connected to distribution circuits can involve a serious problem for its 
reclosers performance, as it invalidates the aforementioned assumption. DG could maintain 
energization of the feeder after the feeder breaker trip. Avoiding potential reclosing 
problems is one of the main reasons for the IEEE standard requirement (IEEE, 2003) 
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according to which, the DG units shall cease to energize the area power system for faults on 
the circuit to which they are connected.  
 
Effective fault arc extinction may be prevented if the DG units keep energizing the circuit 
after the feeder breaker trip due to a fault. If the fault is temporary but the DG does not trip, 
the arc may be maintained even being the feeder breaker opened. In that case, when the 
reclosing attempt is made, the fault arc is not completely extinguished, so the fault becomes 
energized again. This involves the failure of the reclosing attempt and the corresponding 
damage for the system (Conti, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, even if the fault is totally cleared at the moment of reconnection of the 
feeder circuit breaker, out-of-phase recloses can take place if DG units energize the circuit, 
since usually no sync check is made in distribution feeders. The problems derived from an 
out-of-phase reclose may affect both the DG units and the power system: 
 
 In case the DG units connected to the feeder reclosed are rotator generators, they 
could suffer high electromechanical torques, which could damage them.  
 
 The feeder may be subjected to important transient overvoltages, due to the 
different voltage phase angles. These overvoltages could not only damage the 
feeder devices, but also affect the customer systems. Also severe magnetic inrush 
currents could flow through transformers and motors connected to the feeder. 
 
Two immediate possibilities can be raised to avoid the reclosing problems, regarding the 
DG units and the reclosers (IEEE, 2008). The first one, according with the IEEE standard and 
described in section 3.2, is that DG units must trip when a fault occurs in the circuit to which 
they are connected. At the same time, they should not trip if a fault occurs in other 
distribution feeders, even although they are next to the feeder. As it is explained in section 
3.2, most generation technologies present difficulties to detect faults. In these cases, the DG 
units may have severe problems to disconnect themselves under fault conditions. The use of 
communication aided schemes can be a solution for these type of generators since it permits, 
at the same time that the feeder circuit breaker is tripped, a direct transfer trip to be sent to 
the DG units connected to the circuit, regardless of whether they have detected the fault or 
not. The implementation of the standard IEC61850 (IEC, 2003) is going to provide the 
exchange of information and signals between all devices interconnected to the Ethernet 
network, so communication schemes shall be favoured and improved. Fig. 7 shows a 
simplified example of direct transfer trip scheme. 
HV GRID
FEEDER
Relay
breaker
DG1
DG2
DG3
load load
load
Fault Detection: Trip signal
Direct transfer trip to DG units
 Fig. 7. Example of direct transfer trip scheme 
 
On the other hand, reclosing schemes may be slightly modified in order to integrate the 
presence of DG connected to the circuit. A new configuration may include voltage 
supervision prior to sending the closing order to the breaker, so that the breaker is not 
closed until the voltage downstream is under a prefixed value. Using the voltage 
supervision assures that at the reclosing attempt no DG unit is energizing the circuit.  
 
For higher safety, a direct transfer trip scheme like the above explained and a voltage 
supervision reclosing scheme can be combined. 
 
4.3 Asynchronous and synchronous generators. Fault detection problems  
One of the main problems in system protection when installing distributed generation is the 
ability of protective relays to detect external faults, especially in asynchronous generators 
and in generators connected through converters. This is the case of wind turbines. Fig. 8 
shows the most installed configurations of wind turbines. 
 Fig. 8. Wind turbine configuration 
 
Fig. 8a shows the fixed-speed wind turbine with asynchronous squirrel cage induction 
generator (SCIG) directly connected to the grid via transformer. Fig. 8b represents the 
limited variable speed wind turbine with a wound rotor induction generator and partial 
scale frequency converter on the rotor circuit known as doubly fed induction generator 
(DFIG). Fig. 8c shows the full variable speed wind turbine, with the generator connected to 
the grid through a full-scale frequency converter. 
 
Protection engineering software tools used to set and coordinate the protection system 
usually do not include wind generator models. Only the synchronous generator model is 
available in some of them (Electrocon, 2000). This model supposes the short circuit 
contribution constant and equal to the subtransient short circuit current. Therefore, at the 
GB 
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according to which, the DG units shall cease to energize the area power system for faults on 
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energized again. This involves the failure of the reclosing attempt and the corresponding 
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since usually no sync check is made in distribution feeders. The problems derived from an 
out-of-phase reclose may affect both the DG units and the power system: 
 
 In case the DG units connected to the feeder reclosed are rotator generators, they 
could suffer high electromechanical torques, which could damage them.  
 
 The feeder may be subjected to important transient overvoltages, due to the 
different voltage phase angles. These overvoltages could not only damage the 
feeder devices, but also affect the customer systems. Also severe magnetic inrush 
currents could flow through transformers and motors connected to the feeder. 
 
Two immediate possibilities can be raised to avoid the reclosing problems, regarding the 
DG units and the reclosers (IEEE, 2008). The first one, according with the IEEE standard and 
described in section 3.2, is that DG units must trip when a fault occurs in the circuit to which 
they are connected. At the same time, they should not trip if a fault occurs in other 
distribution feeders, even although they are next to the feeder. As it is explained in section 
3.2, most generation technologies present difficulties to detect faults. In these cases, the DG 
units may have severe problems to disconnect themselves under fault conditions. The use of 
communication aided schemes can be a solution for these type of generators since it permits, 
at the same time that the feeder circuit breaker is tripped, a direct transfer trip to be sent to 
the DG units connected to the circuit, regardless of whether they have detected the fault or 
not. The implementation of the standard IEC61850 (IEC, 2003) is going to provide the 
exchange of information and signals between all devices interconnected to the Ethernet 
network, so communication schemes shall be favoured and improved. Fig. 7 shows a 
simplified example of direct transfer trip scheme. 
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On the other hand, reclosing schemes may be slightly modified in order to integrate the 
presence of DG connected to the circuit. A new configuration may include voltage 
supervision prior to sending the closing order to the breaker, so that the breaker is not 
closed until the voltage downstream is under a prefixed value. Using the voltage 
supervision assures that at the reclosing attempt no DG unit is energizing the circuit.  
 
For higher safety, a direct transfer trip scheme like the above explained and a voltage 
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One of the main problems in system protection when installing distributed generation is the 
ability of protective relays to detect external faults, especially in asynchronous generators 
and in generators connected through converters. This is the case of wind turbines. Fig. 8 
shows the most installed configurations of wind turbines. 
 Fig. 8. Wind turbine configuration 
 
Fig. 8a shows the fixed-speed wind turbine with asynchronous squirrel cage induction 
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limited variable speed wind turbine with a wound rotor induction generator and partial 
scale frequency converter on the rotor circuit known as doubly fed induction generator 
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Protection engineering software tools used to set and coordinate the protection system 
usually do not include wind generator models. Only the synchronous generator model is 
available in some of them (Electrocon, 2000). This model supposes the short circuit 
contribution constant and equal to the subtransient short circuit current. Therefore, at the 
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present time, there are two options when the protection coordination must be performed in 
areas with high wind power penetration: to neglect the effects of the wind turbines 
contribution or to model the asynchronous wind turbine as synchronous generator. 
 
4.3.1 Wind turbines before short circuit contribution 
Wind turbines contribution to short circuit is analyzed in this section. Fig. 9 shows the 
current contribution of an SCIG generator. 
 
 Fig. 9. Asynchronous generator rms current contribution 
 
Unlike synchronous generators, induction generators do not have field windings to develop 
the required electro-magnetic field in the air gap of the machine, so induction generators can 
not work without external power supply. Therefore, under fault conditions their air gap flux 
drops quickly and their contribution to the fault is usually negligible after two or three 
cycles (Anderson, 1998). During the first cycles the contribution of the asynchronous 
machine is not despicable (Anderson, 1973), (Das, 2002), therefore, neglecting the induction 
initial short circuit current could lead to errors in the choice of the protective relaying, 
switching equipment and phase settings of the protective relaying. 
 
In order to compare, Fig. 10 shows a synchronous generator short circuit current 
contribution. 
 
 Fig. 10. Synchronous generator rms current contribution 
 
 
Comparing both figures, it is observed than the main difference between the short circuit 
current contributions of a synchronous generator (Fig. 10) and an asynchronous one (Fig. 9) 
is the speed with which it drops. Then, the detection of the fault by the protective device 
must be done before the current contribution drops. The response time of the overcurrent 
relays is around 40 to 60 ms, therefore, if the relay settings for the instantaneous pick up 
current do not take into account the response time of the relay and the time in which the 
contribution drops, the protection could not detect the fault.  
 
DFIG stator is connected directly to the network while its rotor is connected to the network 
by means of a power converter which performs the active and reactive power control. A 
voltage dip causes large currents in the rotor of the DFIG to which the power electronic 
converter is connected, so a high rotor voltage will be needed to control the rotor current. 
When this required voltage exceeds the maximum voltage of the converter, it is not possible 
any longer to control the desired current (Morren & de Haan, 2007). This implies that a large 
current can flow, which could destroy the converter. 
 
In order to avoid breakdown of the converter switches, a crowbar is connected to the rotor 
circuit. When the rotor currents become too high, the converter is disconnected and the high 
currents do not flow through the converter but rather into the crowbar resistances. Then the 
generator operates as an induction machine with a high rotor resistance. When the dip lasts 
longer than a few hundreds of milliseconds (Tmax_crowbar), the wind turbine can even 
support the grid during the dip (Morren & de Haan, 2005).  
 
This behaviour is shown in Fig. 11, a 200 ms short circuit has been simulated. The bold line 
shows the crowbar state, at t = 0.5 s, the fault is produced and the crowbar is activated. After 
Tmax_crowbar ms, the crowbar is deactivated; the rotor is connected to the converter and 
the control of the converter limits the current contribution to its nominal values.  
 
 Fig. 11. DFIG rms short circuit contribution 
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Full converter contribution depends on the converter behaviour before short circuit. Most 
converters can not supply important currents under external fault conditions; usually no 
more than 1.2 to 1.5 times their rated current of the converter. For that reason, it can be 
modeled as a synchronous generator with the option “Limit Maximum Phase Current” 
activated. In this case, fault detection schemes using overcurrent principles that are 
universally applied, are not usually effective. Wind turbines units that use this technology 
must rely on other methods such as abnormal voltage or frequency sensing to detect faults 
on the area power system. 
 
4.3.2 Wind turbine overcurrent protection analysis 
In order to analyse the protection behaviour before wind turbine contribution, and the 
ability of protection software to model this response, the same network has been modelled 
in PSCAD/EMTDC and in CAPE to compare the “real” behaviour of the system with the 
one expected when the protection system is analysed using the models available in 
protection software tools, with the aim of checking, if the representation of the wind 
generator as a synchronous generator is valid in this case. 
 
The wind turbine model in PSCAD/EMTDC consists of the asynchronous generator model, 
the drive train model and the rotor model. The generator and the drive train models have 
been developed by using the models available in the PSCAD/EMTDC library.  
 
Shaft system influence must not be neglected since the shaft oscillations result in 
fluctuations of the voltage, machine current, rotor speed and other electrical and mechanical 
parameters. The shaft system has been modelled by using the PSCAD/EMTDC library 
multi-mass model. The literature about modelling indicates that a two mass model is 
adequate to model the drive train in wind turbines (Akhmatov, 2003).  
 
The rotor is a complex aerodynamic system that can be modelled with different detail levels 
(Petru & Thiringer, 2002). When electrical behaviour is the main point of interest, an 
algebraic relation between wind speed and mechanical power extracted is assumed to 
model the rotor behaviour, which is described by the following equation (Heier, 1998), 
(Slootweg, 2003): 
 
       31/2 ( ) wP A Cp V  (1)  
Where P is the power extracted from the wind [W], ρ the air density [kg/m3]; A the swept 
area [m2] and Vw the wind speed [m/s]. Cp is the performance coefficient that depends on 
λ, the tip speed ratio: 
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Fig. 12 shows the modelled network and the faults (A, B, C, D and E) simulated in 
PSCAD/EMTDC; the same network has been modelled in CAPE. The red squares represent 
the points in which the overcurrent protections are connected. 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 12. Modelled network 
 
Fig. 13 shows test A results obtained with CAPE and PSCAD/EMTDC. The value of the 
current contribution from the wind farm is slightly minor in the PSCAD/EMTDC 
simulation (109.4 A). 
 
 Fig. 13. CAPE and PSCAD results for test A 
 
Table 3 shows the comparison between the tripping time obtained by PSCAD/EMTDC and 
CAPE. Breaker opening time (60 ms) has been taken into account in these results. When the 
instantaneous protection operates (tests B, C, D, E) the results obtained by both softwares 
are similar, with a 15 ms difference in test E. In test A, the inverse time overcurrent 
protection (51) operates in CAPE, but, as it has been seen in the previous sections and in Fig. 
8, when the trip signal is active in CAPE (0.402-0.06), the short circuit current contribution is 
almost zero and the real protection would not trip. Therefore, the result obtained by CAPE 
in test A is incorrect. 
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   CAPE PSCAD 
A BRK_AT Inverse time 0,402 No trip 
B BRK_C1 Instantaneous 0,090 0,0988 
C BRK_C1 Instantaneous 0,090 0,1013 
D BRK_C2 Instantaneous 0,090 0,0994 
E BRK_C2 Instantaneous 0,090 0,1050 
Table 3. Overcurrent times by CAPE and PSCAD/EMTDC 
 
For protection system analysis, CAPE recommends the synchronous generator model with 
the option “Limit Maximum Phase Current” activated to model the wind turbine behaviour. 
This model can be useful to model the full converted wind turbines (Fig. 8c), since the 
converter limits the short circuit current to 1.2 or 1.3 times its rated current value. 
Nevertheless, the DFIG and SCIG short circuit behaviour do not show a good agreement 
with the shown by this model.  
 
Induction machine short circuit contribution drops after a few cycles, but it is not negligible 
in this few first cycles. Due to it, wind farm contribution must be taken into account to set 
the instantaneous overcurrent protection, but not for the inverse time overcurrent 
protection. 
 
If the asynchronous generator current contribution is neglected, the errors in the 
instantaneous protection setting can be significant in those zones with high wind power 
penetration. In case of modelling the asynchronous wind turbine as synchronous generator 
with a correct value for transitory impedance, like in this analysis, the initial behaviour (first 
cycles after the fault) is correct, but in few cycles the contribution of the asynchronous 
generators drops to zero and after those cycles the representation by means of this model no 
longer is adapted. In that order of time, if the model of synchronous generator is used, the 
inverse time overcurrent protection would not be coordinated precisely.  
 
One possibility for asynchronous wind turbine modelling is shown in Fig. 14: a synchronous 
generator model connected to the grid through a switch, which opens 2-3 cycles after the 
fault. Table 4 shows the results obtained by the different models for tests A and B of the 
previous example. The behaviour of the proposed model shows a good agreement with the 
results obtained by PSAD/EMTDC. If the wind turbine contribution is neglected, the 
instantaneous overcurrent protection operation is not correct. If a synchronous model is 
used, the inverse curve overcurrent calculation would be wrong. 
 
 Fig. 14. Proposed model for the protection analysis of asynchronous wind turbines 
 
Synchronous
Z’ 
Breaker opens 2-3 
cycles after the fault
 Trip time in 
CAPE with 
the proposed 
model 
Trip time in 
CAPE neglecting 
wind turbine 
contribution  
Trip time in CAPE 
with the 
synchronous 
model 
Trip time 
in PSCAD 
A Inverse time Infinite Infinite Infinite 0,400 
B Instantaneous 0,090 Infinite 0,0915 0,090 
Table 4. Tripping time with the different models 
 
5. Conclusions and future  
The expectable great penetration of dispersed generators in distribution systems can lead to 
conflicts with the current protection schemes, since they were designed to work in a 
different scenario and under different conditions. 
Most of the problems described in this chapter would be solved with the implementation of 
communication schemes and providing the power system with some “intelligence”. In this 
line, the standard IEC61850 and new developments like Smart Grids are expected to bring 
new tools to integrate DG in distribution systems and overcome the operation problems that 
could arise otherwise. 
Distributed generation integration requires a smart grid to be feasible. This smart grid 
solves the possible problems that can affect the optimum behaviour of the system by 
operating the continuous information of the state of the different installations. The smart 
grid must contribute to the quality and the reliability of the service in the distribution grids 
as well as to improve the energetic efficiency; nevertheless, the integration of these systems 
requires a technological effort in automation and communication due to the fact that the 
exigencies of costs on the distribution systems cannot be comparable to high voltage costs. 
Furthermore, the new international standard for communication networks and systems in 
substation, IEC61850 protocol, is expected to bring a profound evolution in electrical power 
systems. The new functionalities supported by an intelligent application of IEC61850 must 
result in a significant improvement of stability and reliability of power system. Smart grids 
shall take advantage of these features to achieve the commented objectives. Fig. 15 shows an 
example of communications scheme for a smart grid using IEC61850. 
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